Whither Helms-Burton? A Retrospective on the 10th Year Anniversary. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 6 No. 5, February 2006 by Perl, Shoshana.
 
 
  
 
 
   
Robert Schuman 
 
Whither Helms-Burton? A Retrospective on 
the 10
th Year Anniversary 
 
- Shoshana Perl 
  
 
 
 
  Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
Vol. 6 No. 5    
February 2006 
  
 
 
 
 
 
This publication is sponsored by the EU Commission.
  
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper  Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of 
the University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers analyze ongoing developments within the European Union as 
well as recent trends which influence the EU’s relationship with the rest of the world.  
Broad themes include, but are not limited to: 
 
♦  EU Enlargement 
♦  The Evolution of the Constitutional Process 
♦  The EU as a Global Player    
♦  Comparative Regionalisms 
♦  The Trans-Atlantic Agenda 
♦  EU-Latin American Relations 
♦  Economic issues 
♦  Governance 
♦  The EU and its Citizens 
♦  EU Law 
 
As the process of European integration evolves further, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman 
Papers is intended to provide current analyses on a wide range of issues relevant to the 
EU.  The overall purpose of the monographic papers is to contribute to a better 
understanding of the unique nature of the EU and the significance of its role in the world. 
 
Miami European Union Center   Jean Monnet Chair Staff: 
University of Miami      Joaquín Roy (Director) 
1000 Memorial Drive     Aimee Kanner (Editor) 
101 Ferré Building      Roberto Domínguez (Research Assistant) 
Coral Gables, FL 33124-2231  Nuray Ibryamova (Research Assistant) 
Phone:  305-284-3266     Markus Thiel (Research Assistant) 
Fax:  (305) 284 4406      Wendy Grenade (Associate Editor) 
E-Mail: jroy@miami.edu    Eloisa Vladescu (Editorial Assistant) 
Web: www.miami.edu/eucenter 
  
   
Whither Helms-Burton? A Retrospective on the 10
th Year Anniversary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shoshana Perl
 ∗ 
 
 
 
The Jean Monnet Chair 
University of Miami 
Miami, Florida 
February 2006
                                                           
∗ Dr. Shoshana Perl earned her BA in Political Science from Brooklyn College, New York, NY. In 1996 
she received a Masters Degree in American Studies from London’s Institute of United States Studies. Dr. 
Perl completed her doctorate from the London School of Economics in 2005. 
 
   1
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The United States passed the Helms-Burton Act (also known as Libertad) on 12
th March 
1996, hardening the long-standing embargo against Cuba, a poor, inconsequential 
country struggling under one of the last communist dictatorships in the post-Cold War 
world.   
 
  Helms-Burton’s formal title, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 
conveyed the impression of seeking to deliver the oppressed Cuban people from the 
darkness of Castro’s communist police state into the light of a democracy that safeguarded 
civil liberties and human rights.  In fact, the bulk of the legislation was devoted to 
extending and strengthening the embargo against Cuba, and to protecting the property 
rights of American nationals that were expropriated by Castro.  
 
  Furthermore, Libertad transferred executive powers over the Cuban embargo to 
the legislature, effectively strengthening parochial domestic interests in pursuing their 
narrow foreign policy agenda at the expense of the more cosmopolitan view of world 
affairs of the White House. Moreover, Libertad granted Cuban-Americans, who were not 
American citizens at the time their property was nationalised by Castro, the right of 
action in American courts to seek redress from multinational companies who were 
trading in their expropriated assets.   Added to these jurisdictional and constitutional 
problems, Helms-Burton sought to extend American sanctions to third countries' 
legitimate rights to engage in commerce and trade.  The European Union was sufficiently 
irritated by the extraterritorial implications of Helms-Burton to request a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) hearing.   
 
  This paper is written as Helms-Burton celebrates its 10 year anniversary, a 
significant milestone and an appropriate time to analyze what this bill has achieved.   
Helms-Burton has clearly not accomplished its stated aims of either internationalizing the 
embargo or of bringing democracy to Cuba, as Castro continues to rule Cuba with his 
iron fist, and the US remains as isolated as ever in its embargo against Cuba.  This paper 
argues that Helms-Burton was a controversial bill that provoked widespread fears of 
negative repercussions both on Capitol Hill and in the Clinton White House, many of 
which were realized, including a prolonged dispute with the European Union.  It is 
therefore no surprise that Helms-Burton has been sparingly implemented; indeed, this 
paper will highlight evidence of collusion between Washington and Brussels in 
emasculating the bill.  
 
Historical Context  
 
The United States and Cuba have long had an ambivalent relationship.  Their physical 
proximity, with Cuba only ninety miles from the Florida coast, has bound the two 
countries together in an intimate, psychologically charged love-hate association.  Cuba 
increasingly fell under American commercial and cultural hegemony during the twentieth   2
century.  Cuban prosperity depended on American technology, capital and markets, 
despite American policies that discouraged anything but a sugar monoculture.  Cuban 
elites often held dual-citizenship and sent their children to American universities; their 
adoption of American baseball in 1874 symbolized their affinity for 'enlightened' and 
modern North American culture. 
 
  By the 1950s, Cuba had the highest standard of living in Latin America after 
Venezuela, but suffered under the double burden of a politically corrupt regime that was 
culturally and economically dependent on Washington.  Fidel Castro rode to victory in 
1959 on the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century to which was added a strong 
twentieth century anti-American component as revolutionaries were increasingly 
convinced that national self-determination could only be fulfilled by severing all links 
with the United States.  Carlos Eire recalls in a poignant  memoir of his Cuban childhood, 
that children marched daily in the streets, clad in red berets and red neckerchiefs, chanting, 
“Uno, dos, tres, cuatro, Cuba sí, Yanquis no, Cuba sí, Yanquis no…” (Eire 2003: 269) 
 
  Castro's initial liberalism attracted a degree of foreign admiration before the 
revolution gave way to rigid central control, censorship and large-scale nationalization of 
private property.  A comprehensive American embargo against Cuba has been in place 
since early 1962, when it became clear Castro was establishing a Marxist state.   
Washington sought various Cold War objectives through the use of sanctions against 
Cuba, among them instrumental goals such as destabilization of the Castro regime and 
expressive goals such as domestic and international signaling of disapproval of the human 
rights abuses in the country.   
 
  The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 left Cuba bereft of support, and forced 
Castro to liberalize his command economy sufficiently to attract foreign investment.  For 
example, Cuban government brochures advertised properties like the "Hermanos Díaz" 
petroleum refinery in Santiago de Cuba, highlighting the American technology, but failing 
to disclose that the refinery had been confiscated from Texaco in July 1960.  International 
interest in Cuban ventures in the early 1990s alarmed Washington; American embassies 
repeatedly warned against investing in Cuban properties subject to certified claims by 
American nationals. 
 
  In Washington, the sanctions discourse over the relative efficacy of “carrots versus 
sticks” provoked heated debate. The effectiveness of positive versus negative sanctions 
varies in accordance with the level of dependence of the main actors, and with the baseline 
of expectations each has in that relationship.  Thus, incentives are more likely to work 
with a political adversary rather than an ally due to the lower levels of both dependence 
and baseline of expectations inherent in this relationship.   
  For this reason, many argued for the lifting of Cuban sanctions and the gradual 
normalization of relations, as the US had done with many former Cold War adversaries, 
China and Viet Nam to name but two.  They were supported by corporate and agricultural 
interests who were eager to take advantage of the commercial ventures offered by Castro. 
   3
  But the consideration of modifying the forty-year old Cuban embargo entailed 
significant negative political and economic ramifications.  Hard-liners, prominent among 
them the highly politicized and rabidly anti-Castro Cuban-American exile community, 
saw the Cuban economic distress engendered by the loss of the annual $6 million in Soviet 
support as an opportunity to hammer the final nail into Castro's coffin.  Cuban GDP was 
an estimated $334 per capita in 1986, plummeting to just $61 by 1996.  The fall in living 
standards was accompanied by rising discontent among Cuba's military and ruling elite, 
and a growth of civil society opposition.  Sensing Castro's vulnerability, the end of the 
Cold War brought a strengthening rather than a moderation of the American trade 
embargo against Cuba, as symbolism was replaced with substantive expectations. 
   Promotion of democracy and respect for human rights provided the new rationale 
for the intensification of the embargo in the nineties. Amid fears on Capitol Hill that 
Clinton was preparing to moderate the Cuban embargo after his re-election in 1996 (Falk 
1996: 17), Senator Jesse Helms and Congressman Dan Burton introduced their bill in 
early 1995, euphemistically called the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act or 
Libertad, as its stated purpose was "to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom 
and prosperity."    But the lofty democratic intent was no more than a smokescreen to 
legitimize the tightening of the embargo as Washington sought redress for its 
expropriated properties. 
 
 
The Helms-Burton Act 
 
The Helms-Burton Act significantly extended the American embargo and harassed Castro 
in many ways.  For example, Title I mandated that if any international financial 
institution approved a loan to Cuba over the opposition of the US, Washington would 
withhold payment to that institution by an amount equal to the sum total of the loan.  
Title II laid out a number of extremely strict criteria that must be met by a post-Castro 
Cuban government for the embargo to be suspended, including the establishment of an 
independent judiciary and free trade unions.  Most provocatively, Helms-Burton targeted 
foreign companies that acquire or otherwise 'traffic' in Cuban properties that were 
expropriated from their American owners without compensation.  Such firms could 
become subject to lawsuits brought by American claimants to the expropriated properties 
(Title III), and their executives (and families) could be denied entry visas to the United 
States (Title IV).  Title III controversially extended the right of action to Cuban-
Americans who had lost property to Castro’s revolution, but who were not American 
citizens at the time of their loss.  It is significant that Libertad labeled businessmen 
trading in questionable Cuban assets as ‘traffickers,’ a deliberately pejorative term 
generally associated with the illegal drug trade. 
 
  The preferences of the American domestic constituency diverged as Helms-Burton 
faced stiff opposition from the Clinton White House and the Democratic leadership on 
Capitol Hill.  The State Department concluded an interagency study of Libertad by late 
April 1995, broadly arguing that Libertad was counter-productive both to the promotion of   4
democracy in Cuba and to Washington's wider interests; among its specific objections 
were:                                                                                                                 
•  Title I prohibited the importation of sugar from any country that imports sugar 
from Cuba, but this collided with America's long-standing opposition to secondary 
boycotts, and raised fears of a Canadian/EU challenge under NAFTA/WTO rules.  
•  Title II unduly restricted the President in determining both Cuban transition to and 
formation of a democratic government, and should offer a clearer program of 
benefits the US would provide to Cuba under those circumstances.  
•  Title III's definition of 'trafficking' was too broad, and the right of action conferred 
jurisdiction that went well beyond accepted precepts of international law. 
Furthermore, the granting of retroactive rights to Cuban-Americans was contrary 
to standard US practice and principles of international law.    
•  Title IV's visa denial of aliens suspected of 'trafficking' in American assets could 
unfairly affect persons who are not directly responsible for those business 
decisions.  (Sullivan 1995: 7-11) 
 
  Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued robustly against Libertad. Title II 
could damage a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by instituting an overly rigid list 
of requirements.  Title III would create tensions with US allies, was difficult to defend 
under international law, could jeopardize the certified claimants' cases, and was already 
being used by Castro to frighten ordinary Cubans with the specter of Cuban-Americans 
returning to re-claim their homes.  Christopher concluded that the State Department could 
not support Libertad, and "if it were presented to the President, would urge a veto."   
(Christopher 1995)  Indeed, as congressional deliberations heated up in the autumn, the 
Clinton Administration repeatedly threatened to veto Libertad.  Senior presidential 
advisors recommended deletions of Title III for its dubious standing in international law 
and Titles III and IV for fear of creation of friction with US allies. (Administration Policy 
1995) 
 
  The Clinton Administration thus made its opposition to Libertad abundantly clear, 
based on legal, political, constitutional and diplomatic considerations.  In anticipating 
many of the concerns of the international community, Clinton correctly predicted that 
Libertad would create tensions with Washington's closest trading partners.  
 
  The powerful GOP leadership of the House of Representatives obtained approval 
of Libertad on a strongly partisan vote in September 1995.  But the Senate Democratic 
leadership mounted a sustained filibuster to halt the legislation, forcing Senator Helms to 
withdraw the more controversial paragraphs of Title III and IV, before securing passage of 
an emasculated bill in October.   
 
  Castro's brutal shooting down of two American civilian aeroplanes on February 
26, 1996, killing all four Cuban-Americans on board, created what Cuba scholar Jorge 
Domínguez calls a “mobilizing incident,” (Domínguez 1997: 61-63) temporarily uniting 
Washington’s divided constituency in seeking an appropriate and swift response.  The 
Libertad Conference Report produced a bill that was significantly harsher than the 
previous bills.  Not only did it re-instate the contentious Titles III and IV, Cuban-  5
American Congressman Lincoln Díaz-Balart succeeded in incorporating and putting into 
law all existing economic sanctions against Cuba.  This 'codification' of the embargo 
removed an important presidential power in the conduct of foreign policy, revoking his 
authority to lift the embargo and granting this right to Congress, which has traditionally 
been very sensitive to the most conservative elements in the Cuban exile community. The 
extraordinarily inept White House negotiators obtained only one concession for Clinton: 
executive waiver rights over Title III, which were so restricted as to be considered not 
viable by the Conference Report.   
 
  The Helms-Burton Act was passed by overwhelming majorities by both Houses 
of Congress, and signed into law with great fanfare by President Clinton on March 12, 
1996.   
 
  European Union Reaction 
  
Having universally condemned Castro's brutality in killing civilian pilots, the 
international community diverted its anger from Cuba to the US.  The European Union 
(along with Canada and Mexico) expressed dismay at the unilateral nature of the 
measure, particularly in view of the New Transatlantic Agenda concluded the previous 
December that pledged consultation in matters of mutual interest.  EU Commission 
President Jacques Santer argued that Helms-Burton was inconsistent with widely 
accepted principles of international law, contradicted WTO rules and OECD codes, and 
would jeopardize the reputation of the US as a safe market for foreign investment.   
Furthermore, prosecuting American allies would do nothing to further the bill's stated 
objective of promoting democracy in Cuba.  (Santer 1996) 
 
  What was perhaps most extraordinary about the EU's reaction to Helms-Burton 
was the remarkable degree of unity that it fostered. The European Union acted decisively 
on several fronts to defend itself from the extraterritorial reach of the Helms-Burton Act.  
Internally, its Council of Ministers passed a 'blocking action' in October 1996 to protect 
European companies from Libertad’s extraterritoriality. To formally confirm its policy 
towards Cuba, the Council approved the Common Position in December 1996, strongly 
conditioning EU economic co-operation with Cuba on democratic reforms.
1  Externally, 
Brussels requested a World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Panel in late 
1996, challenging the extraterritorial reach of the bill.  Bilateral negotiations led to a 
suspension of the WTO action on 11
th April 1997, as Washington and Brussels agreed to 
hold further talks to settle their differences; the United States meanwhile pledged to take 
no action against European companies under the provisions of Helms-Burton.   
 
           On 18
th May 1998, the US and the EU reached a comprehensive agreement, in 
which Brussels allowed its WTO challenge to lapse in return for an American 
undertaking not to prosecute any European companies under Helms-Burton, and to seek 
                                                           
 
1 This was one of the first acts of the nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the 
EU.   6
an amendment to make Title IV subject to presidential discretion. The accords planned 
the development of protocols to inhibit future investment in illegally expropriated assets 
world-wide, and encouraged co-operation and multilateral dialogue over unilateral action.  
The 15 Member States of the EU ratified the agreement within the week, but, as Congress 
has not made the requisite amendments to Helms-Burton, the US has defaulted.  There is 
a de facto truce as no European entity has been prosecuted under Helms-Burton, but de 
jure, the Helms-Burton episode remains unresolved. 
 
  As the international furore predicted and feared by the White House gathered pace, 
President Clinton applied Libertad exceedingly cautiously.  He fully exercised his 
authority to suspend Title III, and only a handful of businesses were cited under Title IV, 
despite many dozens potentially in violation of this section of Libertad.  Clinton was 
endlessly harassed by Libertad supporters unhappy with his implementation of the bill.  
This paper will consider the evidence suggesting that Clinton colluded with the EU to 
justify his ambivalent implementation of Libertad. 
 
The Waiver and the Common Position: Transgovernmental Collusion? 
 
The Common Position of December 1996 was substantially based upon the Spanish 
initiative hardening the EU stance against Cuba the previous May.  It represented a sea-
change from the long-standing EU policy of 'constructive engagement,' whereby Brussels 
had sought unconditionally to promote the growth of democracy and respect for human 
rights in Cuba through informal cultural and economic exchanges. Many ministers, 
France and Italy foremost among them, objected to the very extreme conditionality of aid 
which they saw as representing a U-turn from established European policy to Cuba, 
leading it closer to American policy.   
 
  Libertad allowed presidential waiver of Title III on the narrow grounds that such 
action was in the national interest, and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.  
The waiver was purposely designed to be unworkable, but President Clinton nevertheless 
suspended Title III with predictable regularity every July and January.  Announcing the 
first waiver in July 1996, that pre-dated the Common Position of December 1996, Clinton 
called upon allies to help "accelerate change" in Cuba, promising that he would decide 
whether to end the suspension "based upon whether others have joined us in promoting 
democracy in Cuba." (Clinton 1996)  In the next suspension in January 1997, Clinton 
referred explicitly to the EU Common Position enacted the previous month declaring, "I 
would expect to continue suspending the right to file suit so long as America's friends and 
allies continue their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba." 
(Clinton 1997)  
 
  Although Brussels repeatedly denied that Europe’s new hard-line Cuba policy had 
been influenced by Washington, Ambassador Hugo Paemen, head of the EU’s delegation 
to Washington, disclosed that, in trying to "de-politicize" the situation, the Common 
Position was prepared "in close contact with some members of the US administration 
(State Department with EU Presidency and Commission)." (Paemen 2001)  This was an 
astonishing and significant admission, corroborated by the Spanish, who first proposed   7
the Common Position to the Council of Ministers on 14
th November, 1996, and who 
conceded that the document "incorporated all the requests put forward in September by 
the special US envoy [Stuart Eizenstat]."  (Arenal 2004)  
 
  This paper argues that this quid-pro-quo was essential in providing Clinton with a 
basis upon which to waive Title III.  The Common Position significantly enhanced 
Clinton’s limited Title III executive waiver authority, enabling him to proclaim that the 
suspensions fulfilled congressional criteria. In a near-perfect solution, the Europeans 
were temporarily protected from prosecution as Clinton consistently deferred Title III’s 
right to action. This understanding represented an extraordinary transgovernmental link 
whereby European and American officials colluded to empower Clinton to prevail over 
his divided domestic constituency. 
 
                  Spanish Role 
 
The Spanish role in promoting the new EU policy was critical.  The May 1996 election of 
José María Aznar, the first conservative government in Spain for fourteen years, heralded 
a radical about-turn: a hard-line Spanish policy toward Cuba through the direct linkage of 
bilateral cooperation agreements with political reform, much to Castro's displeasure.  The 
new Spanish policy was announced on 25
th May at a joint press conference at the end of 
an official visit by American Vice-President Al Gore, and was predictably praised by 
Gore.  Spain applauded Clinton's first waiver of Title III in July 1996, with the Aznar 
government announcing that it would cut $3 million in aid to Cuba unless Castro began 
to institute democratic reforms.  Furthermore, Aznar was responsible for initiating the 
hardening of the EU's Cuba policy, as Madrid presented a draft resolution to the EU 
Foreign Ministers in November 1996 that became the Common Position, making 
European cooperation with Cuba proportional to its democratic reforms. El País reported 
that Aznar's proposal “se alinea estrechamente a la actual política norteaméricanana.” 
2  
 
  Spain, the major European trading partner of Cuba, was certainly threatened by 
Helms-Burton but it seems that the Spanish cut a deal.  With its Prime Minister publicly 
calling for democratic reforms in Cuba, a major Spanish newspaper claimed that the US 
pledged Spain immunity from Helms-Burton; the Clinton Administration denied the 
report.  (Kiger 1997: 65-66)  If indeed such a side-payment were offered, it would explain 
why, with such a large number of Spanish companies operating in Cuba, none was cited 
under Libertad.   
 
 
 
Implementation by Clinton Administration
 
 
                                                           
 
2 Vidal-Folch, Xavier (1996).  “Espana Propone a La Unión Europea Cortar El Crédito y La 
Cooperación con la Habana; Aznar Urge a Los Quince se Eleve El Nivel de Diálogo con La Oposición a 
Castro.” El País (13
th November): p. 3.   8
Not only did Clinton consistently waive Title III, his weak implementation of Title IV, 
banning executives of entities trading in expropriated American assets in Cuba and their 
families from entering the US, resulted in endless harassment from Capitol Hill.  Helms 
reminded the president that Title IV carried no waiver and that "through its failure to 
enforce this provision, the administration has issued what amounts to an effective, and in 
fact, an unlawful waiver."
3   
 
  The executives of  three firms were sent exclusion notices (letters of 
'determination') in early July 1996:  STET, the Italian state-owned communications firm, 
and Grupo Domos, a Mexican communications conglomerate both of whom were joint 
venture partners in the Cuban telecommunications systems, and allegedly 'trafficked' on 
property belonging to ITT, and Sherritt International, a Canadian mining and energy 
group, who allegedly used facilities belonging to Freeport-MacMoRan Co of New 
Orleans.   
 
  The cited officials faced exclusion from the United States with effect 45 days after 
the date on the letter, the time allowed by Libertad to divest themselves of the Cuban 
properties.  Grupo Domos relinquished its stake in the Cuban venture due to financial 
difficulties related to the collapse of the Mexican peso, although Libertad supporters 
proclaimed it showed the bill was a significant deterrent.
4  STET paid compensation of 
some $26m in the summer of 1997 to ITT for the use of its cables for a period of ten years.  
STET's action was characterized as an ‘immunization’ against Libertad, for ITT agreed 
not to sue STET under Title III and the State Department removed STET from its 
exclusion list.    The State Department concluded that the ITT-STET agreement 
"constitutes authorization of [a] United States national who holds a claim to the property 
consistent with Title IV." It claimed that the settlement reinforced respect for property 
rights and was an incentive to foreigners to seek authorization from American claimants 
before investing in Cuba.  (Burns 1997)   
 
  The STET deal highlighted a glaring contradiction in American policy vis-à-vis 
Cuba,  severely undercutting the lofty principles of promoting democracy and respect for 
civil rights that Helms-Burton purportedly espoused.  Payments transformed 'traffickers' to 
legal partners of Castro, embodying the worst American stereotypes and considerably 
weakening Washington's position. (Roy 2000: 113) 
 
  Of the three cited companies, only Sherritt suffered the indignity of exclusion.  
Nine Sherritt executives and their families were banned from the United States, including 
two prominent Britons, Sir Patrick Sheehy, former chairman of BAT Industries of Britain, 
and Rupert Pennant-Rea, former deputy governor of the Bank of England and former 
editor of The Economist. At House implementation hearings, Congressman Robert 
Menéndez stated, "Title IV offers companies a clear choice: observe U.S. law or have 
                                                           
 
3 Schweid, Barry (1997). "Cuba, US: Helms Says He Is Dismayed, Accuses Clinton of Ignoring the 
Law." Associated Press. (16
th July). 
 
 
4 “Domos Drops Cuban Phone Stake: Mexican Firm Hit by Sanctions and Financial Problems,” 
International Herald Tribune, 1
st July 1997, p 16.   9
your rights to visit and conduct business in the United States revoked. Sherritt has made 
its choice." (Menéndez 1996: 4.)   
 
  In a letter to The Times, (Mrs.) Helen Pennant-Rea complained,  "I and my 
children, who have done nothing to offend the US, have been banned since 1996.  I regard 
this as most un-American."
5  Pennant-Rea, when asked whether he had considered 
resigning from his position at Sherritt, answered that it was a matter of principle to stay 
the course and not give up, particularly when the UK was pressing the US to stop applying 
Libertad.
6  Did financial remuneration more than offset the inconvenience of exclusion 
from the United States?  As of December 2005, the ban remains in force against the 
Pennant-Reas, although it has been lifted from their three children, who are no longer 
minors.
7 
 
  Executives of Grupo BM, an Israeli agricultural company, received advisory letters 
in September 1996 that they may be in violation of Title IV.  In September 1997, Grupo 
BM announced a 10-year, $200m project to build an office complex in Havana, under a 
Panama-based subsidiary called Monte Barreto, a move guaranteed to annoy Washington. 
Grupo BM received 'letters of determination' notifying them of their exclusion from the 
United States, dated 13
th November 1997, with effect in 45 days time,
8  (McClenny 1997)  
thus joining Sherritt in an exclusive pariah club. 
 
  State Department officials assured a sceptical Congress that their vigorous 
enforcement of Helms-Burton was having a significant deterrent effect, with at least a 
dozen companies disengaging from Cuba; they cited as an example the Mexican cement 
company Cemex
9, which had terminated its involvement to avoid falling foul of Title IV.  
(Davidow 1996, Eizenstat 1997) Notwithstanding these assurances, the Clinton 
Administration implemented Title IV exceedingly sparingly.  To this day, Grupo BM and 
Sherritt remain the only companies whose executives are still excluded from the United 
States, despite the evidence that there were some 200 companies from 26 countries who 
had commercial dealings with Cuba, many of whom were potentially in violation of Title 
IV.  (Dodd 1996)   
 
 
 
Implementation by Bush Administration 
                                                           
 
5 Pennant-Rea, Helen (2000). US Embargo on Trade with Cuba. Letter to the Editor, The Times. 
London. (7
th November). 
 
6 Ryle, S. (2001). "America's Door Policy: Red Light; Banned in the USA." The Observer: 5. (3
rd 
June). 
 
7 Helen Pennant-Rea confided that they had a “farcical” time getting the State Department to agree 
that the definition of “minor” is age 18.  (Email correspondence 23
rd November, 2005) 
 
8 Grupo BM's Miramar trade centre was inaugurated in October 1999.  See Pascal Fletcher, 
"Israeli Office Venture is Launched in Cuba," Financial Times, 13
th October 1999, p 7. 
 
9  It was unclear why Cemex reversed its decision, with some suggesting it was due to a sharp drop 
in its share value.  See George Gedda, "US Moves to Implement Cuba Sanctions against Investors." 
Associated Press. 29
th May, 1996.  10
When President George W. Bush acceded to the White House in 2001, there was a degree 
of apprehension in Washington over whether he would continue his predecessor's practice 
of suspending Title III so as not to break the uneasy truce with the EU.  The anxiety was 
heightened because as a Republican, Bush would come under greater pressure to enforce 
Libertad.  Furthermore, Bush felt indebted to Florida for its remarkable role in the 
presidential elections, and to his brother Jeb, Florida's governor.  This unease was shared 
in Europe.  An EU Commission official expressed hope that the US would "maintain and 
fully implement" the Understanding at the Gothenburg Summit in June 2001. The 
Financial Times urged Bush to bury "this pointless and troublesome law."
10 
 
  President Bush pragmatically chose to maintain the ceasefire.  On 16
th July 2001, 
he announced the suspension of Title III, following Clinton's well-established precedent of 
arguing that it "is necessary for the national interest of the United States and will expedite 
the transition to democracy in Cuba," and specifically linking the continuing American 
waiver to the continuing European renewal of the Common Position with regard to Cuba. 
Bush conceded that "real differences remain" between the US and its allies, but argued 
that this action "will encourage support for the embargo." (Bush 2001)   
 
  In continuing Clinton's policy of ten consecutive suspensions of Title III, George 
W. Bush tactically presented the Cuban-American hardliners with side payments: 
tightening the embargo by, for example, greater travel restrictions, and nominating right-
wing Cuban-American Otto Reich to the position of Assistant Secretary of State for 
Western Hemisphere Affairs.
11  Bush succeeded in gaining hard-line support; Jesse Helms 
declared that those who criticised the suspension should "consider the other salutary 
initiatives that the president is putting into force."
12  To date, President Bush has continued 
to exercise the global Title III waiver every six months. 
 
  Overall, President Bush has presided over a tightened Cuba policy characterised as 
"rejection, isolation, and pressure" (Fisk 2004) and has made key appointments of widely 
recognised hard-liners commensurate with this aim.  Following his failure to secure 
Reich's Senate confirmation, Bush appointed another well-known ideologue, Roger 
Noriega, who was confirmed in July 2003, ably assisted by Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Daniel Fisk.  Fisk was responsible for the drafting of Libertad in his role as senior staffer 
to Helms’ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Noriega served as a Helms staffer 
during that period.  Caleb McCarry completed the triumvirate of hard-line former 
congressional staffers with his appointment on 28
th July 2005 to the position of Cuba 
                                                           
 
10 "Bush and Cuba," Financial Times Editorial, 16
th July 2001, p. 16. 
 
11 Reich's nomination was extremely controversial, given his paid lobbying on behalf of hard-line 
Cuban-Americans, and his questionable association with the 1980s Iran-Contra Affair, which illicitly 
sought to gain support for the anti-Sandinista Contras in Nicaragua.  The Democratic Senate predictably 
delayed Reich's confirmation, leading Bush to make a 'recess appointment' during the second session of the 
107
th Congress (2002).  In early 2003, Reich was appointed 'Special Envoy' for Latin America, a post that 
needs no confirmation; although the Senate was Republican again, there was strong bipartisan antipathy to 
Reich on Capitol Hill.  See Larry Birns, “Reich Re-surfaces Again – This Time at the NSC,” Press 
Memorandum, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), 15
th January 2003. 
 
12 De Young, Karen (2001). "Bush Continues A Clinton Policy on Cuba." The Washington Post: 
A10. (17
th July).  11
Transition Coordinator; the creation of this post was recommended in May 2004 by Bush's 
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) that "proposed a comprehensive 
strategy to prepare for a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba....empowering Cuban 
civil society ...to deny resources to the Castro regime to break its blockade on 
information..." (Rice 2005).  
 
           CAFC recommended further tightening Cuba policy by restricting the definition of 
immediate family members to exclude aunts, uncles and cousins, anathema to the family-
minded Cuban-Americans.   By June 2004, President Bush had announced that cash 
remittances could only be sent to immediate family members, and that annual visits to 
immediate family members would be restricted to once in three years. (Sullivan 2005)  
Speaking in Miami in October 2004, Fisk estimated that the flow of remittances amounted 
to $1.5bn annually, and characterized family visits as having been abused due to lack of 
effective controls.  He claimed that the new restrictions could deny Castro up to $0.5bn 
annually, and urged Cuban-Americans to remember "that these are a means to an end: the 
end of the Castro dictatorship."  (Fisk 2004) 
 
  With regard to Title IV determinations, the State Department cited a Jamaican 
hotel, SuperClubs, in April 2004; no sanctions were imposed as SuperClubs divested 
rapidly.  Deputy Assistant Secretary Fisk proudly proclaimed "This was the first 
determination in five years.  The law was implemented; the law worked." (Fisk 2004)  In 
July 2005, Fisk disclosed that the State Department was actively reviewing 26 cases of 
‘trafficking’ in addition to closely monitoring the directors of Sherritt International and 
Grupo BM, where sanctions were imposed against four new officers of  these two firms, 
and one officer was removed from the sanctions list.
13  Impudently ignoring Helms-
Burton, Sherritt International continues to expand its production on the island, oblivious to 
the continuing Title IV sanctions against its executives.  In March 2005 Sherritt 
announced that its Cuban joint venture plans to spend $450m to increase production of 
nickel and cobalt.
14  
 
  Grupo Sol Meliá 
 
It is noteworthy that SuperClubs was a Jamaican entity, not a European one.  Despite 
unremitting campaigns by Libertad supporters, demands to sanction European entities, 
particularly Spanish companies, have never been successful; such action risked torpedoing 
the uneasy truce between Washington and Brussels, as both Spain and the EU warned that 
they would re-instate a WTO appeal if its firms were sanctioned.  
 
  Perhaps the most extraordinary pressure that both the Clinton and the Bush 
Administrations have endured centered on efforts to sanction the Spanish hotel group 
Grupo Sol Meliá (GSM), one of the leading hotel chains in Cuba.  GSM allegedly built 
hotels on beachfront property formerly owned by the Sánchez family, owners of a 
100,000-acre sugar plantation.  The family formed an American company, Central Santa 
Lucia, LC (CSLLC) to represent their unified claims. Their attorney Nick Gutiérrez claims 
                                                           
 
13 Email correspondence, 15
th July 2005. 
 
14 “Sherritt, Cuba to Spend $450 Mln to Boost Mine Output,” Bloomberg 4
th March 2005.  12
GSM opened two hotels in January 1996, which pre-dated Helms-Burton, but there was 
new construction after March 1996.  GSM therefore received a very mild State 
Department letter in June 1996, followed by an official advisory letter on 30
th July 1999.  
Finally, GSM received an expanded advisory letter in March 2001, advising them that the 
five-year management contract on the two hotels that were opened in January 1996 had 
expired, and warning that renewal would place GSM in breach of Libertad.
15    
 
  GSM claimed it was cleared by the State Department for infringement of Libertad 
in 1996, and did not understand why it was the subject of a further inquiry three years on, 
especially as they managed, rather than owned, the hotels. Undeterred, GSM was 
operating fourteen hotels by 1999, with plans for expansion of five more hotels in 2000.
16 
 
  GSM held the EU's Blocking Action as a shield against settling compensation with 
CSLLC.  However, Gutiérrez claimed that both the Spanish Embassy in Washington (in 
mid-2000) and the European Commission (in late 2001) declared that a compensation 
agreement would be acceptable in principle.  Gutiérrez further claimed he had been urged 
by the State Department to settle the claims of the Sánchez family against GSM, for this 
would "get them off the hook," characterizing a settlement as a "win-win" scenario for 
all,
17  following the precedent set by STET's compensation to ITT in 1997.  A European 
Commission official confirmed that the Clinton Administration had a vested interest in 
GSM brokering a deal with the Sánchez family, as it offered an elegant escape.   
 
  As bilateral negotiations commenced between the Sánchez family and GSM, 
CSLLC demanded $10 million compensation.  GSM's attorney claimed that the disputed 
property was worth a mere $3,000 in 1962, and accused the State Department of mounting 
an extortion game on behalf of the claimants.  GSM hoped that mounting EU pressure 
would deter further US action as the European Commission had warned the US that it 
would vigorously defend GSM.
18  
 
  Nick Gutiérrez was guardedly optimistic that citations would be forthcoming 
against Grupo Sol Meliá with Noriega
19 and Fisk ensconced in the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, complemented by McCarry in his new role as Cuba Transition 
Coordinator.  Gutiérrez claims GSM is operating three hotels on land belonging to the 
Sánchez family: the two neighboring hotels, since merged into one, which GSM became 
liable for in January 2001 upon renewal of their management contract; a hotel built in 
1999; and a hotel opened in 2002, and billed as a Cuban hotel, rather than as Sol Meliá.  
Gutiérrez claims that the State Department recently sent GSM a letter of determination, 
and he feels that Sol Meliá is somewhat vulnerable now that it is managing a hotel in 
                                                           
 
15 Interview, 31
st January 2002. 
 
16 García-Zarza, Isabel (1999). "Spain's Sol Meliá Undeterred in Cuba by US Threat." Reuters. 
Havana. (4
th November). 
 
17 Interview, 31
st January 2002. 
 
18 Alden, Edward (2001). "Signals of Harder Line on Cuba Give Castro Opponents Cause for 
Jubilation." Financial Times: 11. (3
rd March). 
 
19 Noriega resigned his State Department position in July 2005.  The New York Times attributed 
his resignation to the McCarry appointment, which removed responsibility for Cuba from him.  13
Miami.
20  Sol Meliá is widely viewed as a test case whose Title IV citation could open the 
flood gates to many more determinations.   
 
  It is nothing short of extraordinary that the Sánchez family and Nick Gutiérrez 
continue to harbor such wildly unrealistic expectations after so many years.  With explicit 
warnings from Spain and the European Union that the WTO Panel would be re-activated, 
what has the State Department to gain from such folly?  Washington is understandably 
reluctant to open this Pandora’s Box, risking a transatlantic dispute with close trading 
partners, over as insignificant a country as Cuba.   
 
Conclusion: 
This paper has shown that the Helms-Burton Act has never been actively implemented by 
either the Clinton or the Bush Administrations. The reservations predicting needless 
provocation of close allies and trading partners voiced by the Clinton White House during 
the Helms-Burton debates in 1995 came to fruition.  Clinton successfully persuaded 
Washington's European trading partners to act as proxies in propelling Castro to move 
towards democracy, with the side-payment being that Title III was repeatedly waived and 
Title IV was invoked only against five companies in ten years (of whom only one was 
European, STET, the Italian telecommunications company), despite some 200 companies 
being accountable under it.  The only two entities whose executives continue to endure 
exclusion from the US under Title IV are the Canadian Sherritt International and the 
Israeli Grupo BM.   
 
  Moreover, the European Union’s strategy of challenging American unilateralism 
and extraterritorial tendencies with a World Trade Organization hearing was successful. 
Although the EU was castigated for negotiating a settlement with the US rather than 
litigating before a WTO Panel, the EU won the protection it sought; the European threat of 
a WTO renewal continues to constrain the State Department, effectively immunizing its 
entities from Libertad.  The political settlement, though delicate and inchoate, diffused the 
dispute and remains respected by both Washington and Brussels.  
 
  Helms-Burton has atrophied rather than encouraging democracy in Cuba and 
heralding a robust new era in Cuban-American relations. Indeed, Professor Joaquín Roy 
claims that high-ranking Cuban officials called Libertad a regalo del cielo, a gift from 
heaven for Castro.   William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine argue that, aside from the fact that 
the embargo allows Castro to blame his catastrophic economic position on the Americans, 
it enables him to play a role on the world stage. Lifting the embargo would humiliate 
Castro by announcing how irrelevant he is in the 21
st century. (Ratliff and Fontaine 2000: 
18-19) Even as Libertad withers, its greatest legacy could be the acknowledgement that 
the time has come for Washington to courageously and unilaterally modify Cuba policy.  
Unfortunately, with Washington’s announcement that the Commission for Assistance to a 
Free Cuba is to reconvene and issue a report in 2006, the early likelihood of any real 
changes in Cuba policy remains bleak.  
 
                                                           
 
20 Phone conversation, 14
th July 2005.  14
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